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be used as an inexpensive screening device, and we find empirically that firms choosing PSD
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1 Introduction
This paper studies performance-sensitive debt (PSD), the class of debt obligations whose interest
payments depend on some measure of the borrower’s performance. For instance, step-up bonds
compensate credit rating downgrades with higher interest rates and credit rating upgrades with
lower interest rates.1 The vast majority of PSD obligations charge a higher interest rate as
the borrower’s performance deteriorates. We refer to such obligations as risk-compensating PSD
obligations.
This paper addresses two questions. Why do firms issue PSD obligations? How should PSD
obligations be valued? We propose a method to price PSD obligations and use it to prove that,
in a setting with no market imperfections other than bankruptcy costs and tax benefits of debt,
risk-compensating PSD schemes have an overall negative effect on the issuing firm. Thus, the
existence of risk-compensating PSD obligations cannot be explained by the popular trade-off
theory of capital structure and should be explained by other market frictions. We show that PSD
obligations can be used as a screening device in a setting with asymmetric information. Using
data on loan contracts between 1995 and 2005 from Thomson Financial’s SDC database, we find
that firms whose loans have performance pricing provisions are more likely to be upgraded and less
likely to be downgraded one year after the closing date of the loan than firms with fixed-interest
loans.
Our paper builds on Leland (1994), in which the firm’s equityholders choose the default time
that maximizes the equity value of the firm. We model performance-sensitive debt as a function
C : Π 7→ R+ mapping some performance measure pi to the interest rate C(pi). In this setting,
the equity value associated with a given PSD profile satisfies an ordinary differential equation.
We obtain closed-form pricing of PSD in important special cases, including step-up bonds with
an arbitrary number of rating triggers. Considering general diffusions allows one to model such
stochastic features as mean reversion of the cash-flow process or the negative relation between
cash-flow volatility and level.2
For PSD obligations C and D that are based on the same performance measure, we say that
1The term “step-up bonds” has dual use. We use it only to refer to performance-sensitive issues. The term is
sometimes also used to denote bonds with time-dependent coupons.
2Bhattacharya (1978) is an early advocate of the explicit consideration of mean-reverting cash flows in financial
models. Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) show that some predictions of the trade-off theory (the positive relation
between earnings and leverage) can be reversed when one allows for mean-reverting cash flows, reconciling the
trade-off theory with empirical facts. For the negative relation between cash-flow volatility and level, see for
example Myers (1977), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), and Smith and Stulz (1985).
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C is more risk compensating than D if C −D is non-increasing and non-constant. We prove that
if C and D raise the same amount of cash, and if C is more risk compensating than D, then C
is less efficient than D, in the sense that C induces an earlier default time, which means a higher
present value of bankruptcy costs and lower equity equity value. In particular, a PSD obligation
is less efficient than a debt obligation with a fixed interest rate of the same market value.
To explain the existence of risk-compensating PSD, we develop a screening model,3 in which
the future growth rate of the firm is unknown to the market, but known to the firm’s manager.
We demonstrate that there exist separating equilibria, in which the high-growth firm issues a
risk-compensating PSD obligation, while the low-growth firm issues fixed-interest debt. The low-
growth firm does not want to mimic the high-growth firm because for a given risk-compensating
PSD obligation the low-growth firm will likely pay higher interest in the future than the high-
growth firm. As it separates different types through different interest payments, not through
different bankruptcy costs, issuing a risk-compensating PSD is an inexpensive way for the high-
growth-type firm to signal its type.4
The separating equilibrium studied here is related to the pecking-order theory, first introduced
by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984).5 We show that PSD can be less sensitive to the
private information of the firm than fixed-interest debt. Therefore, risk-compensating PSD is
preferred to fixed-interest debt.
Our screening hypothesis predicts that high-growth firms issue risk-compensating PSD obliga-
tions to separate themselves from low-growth firms. Issuing a risk-compensating PSD obligation
should thus be followed by an improvement in the credit rating of the issuing firm. To test this
prediction, we obtain bank loan data on 5,020 loans to public firms between 1995 and 2005 from
3Previous research has studied the use of financial securities for signaling or screening purposes. See, for example,
Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999).
These studies, however, restrict themselves to a static setting and fixed-interest debt. Flannery (1986) and Diamond
(1991) study signaling through the choice of debt maturity. Sannikov (2009) studies dynamic screening with
increasing lines of credit and fixed-interest debt. Hennessy, Livdan, and Miranda (2009) study a repeated signaling
setting in which the type of the firm changes over time and the firm can borrow by issuing equity or one-period
debt.
4This result relates our paper to the literature on non-dissipative signaling. See, for example, Bhattacharya
(1980).
5Several papers have found empirical evidence supporting the predictions of the pecking-order theory. For
example, Asquith and Mullins (1986) find that a stock issue drives down the stock price by roughly 3%. Dierkens
(1991) and D’Mello and Ferris (2000) find that the price impact of a stock issue announcement is greater for firms
in which the information asymmetry is large. Eckbo (1986) and Shyam-Sunder (1991) find that the announcement
of a debt issue has a smaller downward impact on stock price than the announcement of an equity issue.
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Thomson Financial’s SDC database. Approximately 40% of our sample consists of loans with per-
formance pricing provisions. Controlling for firm and loan characteristics, we show that borrowers
whose loans have performance pricing provisions are more likely to be upgraded and less likely
to be downgraded one year after the closing date of the loan than borrowers with fixed-interest
loans. This result supports our screening hypothesis, since a prediction of our model is that
in equilibrium high-growth borrowers issue risk-compensating PSD, while low-growth borrowers
issue fixed-interest debt. The result is robust to a variety of empirical specifications.
Models of the valuation of risky debt can be divided into two classes. Our model belongs to the
class that treats a firm’s liabilities as contingent claims on its underlying assets, and bankruptcy
as an endogenous decision of the firm. This class includes Black and Cox (1976), Fischer, Heinkel,
and Zechner (1989), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996) and Duffie and Lando (2001). In the
second class of models, bankruptcy is not an endogenous decision of the firm. There is either an
exogenous default boundary for the firm’s assets (see Merton (1974) and Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995)), or an exogenous process for the timing of bankruptcy, as described in Jarrow and Turnbull
(1995), Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997) and Duffie and Singleton (1999).
Das and Tufano (1996), Acharya, Das, and Sundaram (2002), Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst
(2004), and Lando and Mortensen (2005) obtain pricing formulas for step-up bonds using the
second class of models of the valuation of risky debt. Since they examine only an exogenous
default process, the effect of performance-sensitive debt on the default time is not apparent in
their models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our general model
and formalizes the notion of PSD. Section 3 analyzes the case of asset-based PSD obligations,
demonstrating their relative efficiency. In Section 4, we explicitly derive the valuation of linear
PSD obligations. Section 5 deals with general performance measures, and solves for the case
of ratings-based PSD. Section 6 demonstrates that risk-compensating PSD can be used as a
screening device in a setting with asymmetric information. Section 7 contains the empirical
analysis. Section 8 discusses other reasons that may explain the existence of different types of
PSD and extensions of the analysis. Section 9 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The General Model
We consider a generalization of the optimal liquidation models of Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner
(1989) and Leland (1994). A firm generates after-tax cash flows at the rate δt, at each time t. We
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assume that δ is a diffusion process governed by the equation
dδt = µδ(δt)dt + σδ(δt)dBt, (1)
where µδ and σδ satisfy the classic assumptions for the existence of a unique strong solution to (1)
and B is the standard Brownian motion.
Agents are risk neutral and discount future cash flows at the risk-free interest rate r. The
expected discounted value of the firm at time t is
At = Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t) δs ds
]
<∞ (2)
which is finite if the growth rate µδ is less than the discount rate r. By the Markov property, At
only depends on cash-flow history through the current cash-flow δt, implying that {At}t≥0 is also
a diffusion with some drift µ and volatility σ:
dAt = µ(At)dt + σ(At)dBt. (3)
The asset level At is increasing in the current cash flow δt (this intuitive statement is proved
in the Appendix). Therefore, there exists an increasing function δ : R → R such that current cash
flow is a function of current asset level: δt = δ(At).
We consider a performance measure represented by a stochastic process {pit}t≥0 taking values
in some ordered space Π. The performance pit can be any statistic measuring the firm’s ability
and willingness to serve its debt obligations in the future. Financial ratios and credit ratings are
among commonly used performance measures.
A performance-sensitive debt (PSD) obligation is a claim on the firm that promises a non-
negative payment rate that may vary with the performance measure of the firm. Formally, a PSD
obligation C( · ) is a function C : Π→ R, such that the firm pays C (pit) to the debtholders at time
t.6 For example, the consol bond of Leland (1994) is a degenerate case of PSD. The reader should
note that, while our earlier sections dealt mostly with “risk-compensating” PSD (that pay higher
coupons when performance worsens), our definition encompasses more general kinds of PSD. It
is also worth noting that C represents the total debt payment. If the firm has a complex capital
structure that includes various issues of PSD obligations and also fixed-coupon debt, then C (pit)
6We are considering perpetual debt, which is a standard simplifying assumption for the endogenous default
framework. See, for example, Leland (1994). However, our model can be extended to the case of finite average debt
maturity, if we assume that debt is continuously retired at par at a constant fractional rate. See Leland (1998) for
more on this approach.
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is the sum of the payments for each of the firm’s obligations at time t given7 the performance pit.
In other words, a combination of PSD obligations is a PSD obligation.
Given a PSD obligation C, the firm’s optimal liquidation problem is to choose a default time
τ̂ to maximize its initial equity value WC0 , given the debt structure C. That is,
WC0 ≡ sup
τ̂∈T
E
[∫ τ̂
0
e−rt[δt − (1− θ)C (pit)] dt
]
, (4)
where T is the set of Ft stopping times, θ is the corporate tax rate, and (1 − θ)C (pit) is the
after-tax effective coupon rate. If τ∗ is the optimal liquidation time, then the market value of the
equity at time t < τ∗ is
WCt = Et
[∫ τ∗
t
e−r(s−t)[δs − (1− θ)C (pis)] ds
]
. (5)
Analogously, the market value UCt of the PSD obligation C at time t is
UCt ≡ Et
[∫ τ∗
t
e−r(s−t)C (pis) ds
]
+ Et
[
e−r(τ
∗−t) (Aτ∗ − ρ(Aτ∗))
]
, (6)
where ρ(A) is the bankruptcy cost. We assume that ρ(A) is increasing in A and is less than the
asset level at time of default.
If δt is lower than (1−θ)C(pit), equityholders have a net negative dividend rate.8 Equityholders
will continue to operate a firm with a negative dividend rate if the firm’s prospects are good enough
to compensate for the temporary losses.
3 Asset-Based PSD
Since the market value A of assets is a time-homogeneous Markov process, the current asset level
At is the only state variable in our model, and any measure of the borrower’s earnings prospect
at time t is determined solely by At. Therefore, the asset level At itself can be taken as the
performance measure. An asset-based PSD is a PSD whose coupon rate C (At) depends only on
the current asset level.
7If different PSD obligations issued by the firm depend on different performance measures, the total debt payment
by the firm can be represented as PSD that depends on a single performance measure. This is possible because, as
we will see later, any relevant performance measure can be described by the current asset level and the asset level
at which the firm goes bankrupt.
8Limited liability is satisfied if the negative dividend rate is funded by dilution – for example, through share
purchase rights issued to current shareholders at the current valuation.
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3.1 Valuation
Given an asset-based PSD, the initial value of the equity is:9
W (A0) ≡ sup
τ̂∈T
E
[∫ τ̂
0
e−rt [δ(At)− (1− θ)C (At)] dt
]
.
The optimal default time is of the form τ∗ = τ(AB), where τ(A) denotes the first (“hitting”) time
that the asset level hits the threshold A. Therefore, the equityholders’ optimal problem can be
expressed as:
W (x) = sup
y<x
W˜ (x, y), (7)
where
W˜ (x, y) ≡ Ex
[∫ τ(y)
0
e−rt [δ(At)− (1− θ)C(At)] dt
]
.
The function W˜ (x, y) represents the equity value if shareholders decided to default at the threshold
y and the current asset value is x. We assume that C grows at most linearly in x and require
that C be right-continuous with left limits. The exact technical conditions and the proof of the
following theorem are provided in the Appendix. In what follows, x¯ is the asset level below which
the coupon payment rate exceeds the cash-flow rate, as defined in Condition 3 of the Appendix.
Theorem 1 Optimal default triggering level AB and corresponding equity value W (x) are char-
acterized by the following conditions:
(i) AB ∈ (0, x¯).
(ii) W is continuously differentiable and W ′ is bounded and left and right differentiable.
(iii) W is equal to zero on [0, AB ] and satisfies the following ODE at any point of continuity of
C:
1
2
σ2(x)W ′′(x) + µ(x)W ′(x)− rW (x) + δ(x)− (1− θ)C(x) = 0. (8)
for x ≥ AB.
Continuous differentiability ofW and the fact thatW vanishes on [0, AB ] imply thatW
′(AB) =
0, which is known as the smooth-pasting condition. Theorem 1 provides a method for solving the
firm’s optimal liquidation problem.
9Throughout this section, we omit the superscript C and the subscript 0 whenever there is no ambiguity.
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1. Determine the set of continuously differentiable functions that solve ODE (8) at every
continuity point of C. It can be shown that any element of this set can be represented
with two parameters,10 say L1 and L2.
2. Determine AB , L1, and L2 using the following conditions:
a. W (AB) = 0.
b. W ′ is bounded.
c. W ′(AB) = 0.
d. AB ∈ (0, x¯).
We interpret (a) as the boundary condition of the solution at the point AB . Condition (b) says
that W ′(x) remains bounded as the asset level gets arbitrarily large, and constitutes the second
boundary condition of the solution. The smooth-pasting condition (c) is a first-order optimization
condition that defines the optimal bankruptcy boundary. Condition (d) ensures that, with the
solution found above, default occurs when coupon payments are higher than the cash-flow rate.
Necessity is an important part of Theorem 1, establishing that the optimal stopping rule can
be determined by resolution of (8). In particular, Theorem 1 implies that the value function is
continuously differentiable and not merely a “viscosity solution” of the optimal control problem
faced by equityholders.
Using the fact that the sum of the equity value, the PSD value, and the expected losses
resulting from the bankruptcy is the sum of the asset level and the present value of the tax
benefits,11 we obtain the PSD pricing formula:
U (At) =
1
1− θ [At −W (At)− [ρ(AB) + θ(AB − ρ(AB))] ξ(At, AB)] (9)
where ξ(x, y) = Ex[e
−τ(y)r ] is the expected discount factor between current time and default,
when current asset level is x and default triggering level is y.
10In fact, we really consider here solutions of coupled equations (36) and (37), which boil down to the ODE (8)
at any continuity point of C. One can easily check that the set of solutions of the coupled equations is still a
two-dimensional vector space.
11Bankruptcy cost is ρ (AB) ξ (At, AB). The tax benefits are given by TB (At) =
∫ τ(AB)
0
e−rtθC (At) dt =
θU (At)− (AB − ρ (AB)) ξ (At, AB) .
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3.2 The Relative Efficiency of Asset-Based PSD
In this subsection, we derive a partial order, by “efficiency,” among alternative PSD issues that
raise the same amount of cash. We need the following definitions and condition, that we state in
terms of a general performance measure pi. These will also be used in Section 5 for the case of
credit ratings.
Definition 1 (Relative Efficiency). Let C and D be PSD that raise the same funds, UC0 = U
D
0 .
We say that C is less efficient than D if it determines a lower equity price, that is, if WC0 < W
D
0 .
Definition 2 (Risk Compensating). Let C and D be PSD issues based on the same performance
measure. We say that C is more risk compensating than D if C − D is a non-increasing, not
constant function.
A fixed-coupon bond is a natural benchmark to compare PSD obligations. We will refer
to PSD obligations that are more risk compensating than a fixed-coupon bond simply as risk-
compensating PSD obligations.
Figure 1 illustrates the “risk-compensating” concept.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Condition 1 (Efficiency Domain). A PSD obligation C is said to be in the efficiency domain
if, for any constant α > 0, we have UC−α0 < U
C
0 , where C − α denotes a PSD issue that pays
C (At)− α at time t.
Condition 1 means that it is not possible to raise the same amount of cash as C by a constant
downward shift in its coupon rate. For example, a bond paying a fixed-coupon rate c raises
an increasing amount of cash as c increases, until c reaches a point at which the loss due to
precipitated default dominates the gain due to the increase of coupon payment (as in Figure 2).
Theorem 2 Suppose C and D are asset-based PSD satisfying12 UC0 = U
D
0 and Condition 1. If
C is more risk compensating than D, then C is less efficient than D.
The above result is supported by the following intuition. Equityholders decide to declare
bankruptcy when coupon payments become too high compared with the future prospects of the
12Throughout this section, we also assume the technical conditions required for analysis of the previous section
(see the Appendix).
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firm. At this time, the firm pays higher interest rates with C than with D. While there is a
possibility that the situation will be reversed in the future, the urgency of the current situation
increases the firm’s incentive to declare bankruptcy.
The intuition can be further illustrated by the opposite, extreme example of a bond paying an
after-tax coupon rate equal to the after-tax cashflow rate (1− θ)C(At) = δ(At). This coupon rate
decreases to zero as the asset level goes to zero. The coupon payments never exceed the cash flow,
so the firm never goes bankrupt. Such a bond transfers all the value of the firm to debtholders,
and, if it could qualify as “debt” for tax purposes, would reduce tax payments to zero since the
tax benefit resulting from coupon payments is equal to the tax on the dividends.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Corollary 1 Let C be a PSD issue satisfying Condition 1. If C is non-increasing and not con-
stant, it is less efficient than the fixed-interest PSD issue raising the same amount of cash and
verifying Condition 1. If C is non-decreasing and not constant, it is more efficient than any
fixed-interest PSD issue raising the same amount of cash.
The result suggests that, in many settings, the issuer would choose the least risk-compensating
form of debt that qualifies as “debt” for tax treatment. In practice, various forms of PSD are
observed. Although many debt obligations with performance-pricing provisions are more risk
compensating than flat-rate debt, others reduce debt payments when the firm performs poorly.
For example, catastrophe bonds, usually issued by insurance companies, promise coupons that
are contractually reduced in case total losses in the insurance industry are above a pre-specified
threshold. Income bonds require the issuer to make scheduled coupon payments only if the issuer
has enough earnings to do so. Renegotiation of bank loans often leads to lower interest payments
when the firm is financially distressed, which in fact is implicit performance pricing. Hackbarth,
Hennessy, and Leland (2007) study renegotiation of bank loans in a setting with endogenous
default. When firms engage in risk management activities, they typically enter into financial
contracts whose payoffs reduce the debt burden when the firm performs poorly.13
13Morellec and Smith (2007) study the role of risk management in resolving the underinvestment and free cash-
flow problems.
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4 Example: Linear PSD
In this section, we solve our model explicitly for linear PSD. The Appendix contains a closed-
form solution for step-up PSD. Throughout this section, we assume that the asset process is a
geometric Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ2. This implies that δ(x) = (r−µ)x, and
that ξ(x, y) =
(
x
y
)−γ1
, where γ1 =
m+
√
m2 + 2rσ2
σ2
and m = µ − σ22 . We consider the coupon
scheme given by C (x) = β0 − β1x , with β0 > 0.
Applying Theorem 1, the corresponding equity value is
W (x) = λ
(
x−AB
(
x
AB
)−γ1)
− β0
r
(
1−
(
x
AB
)−γ1)
, (10)
and the optimal bankruptcy boundary is
AB =
γ1β0
λ (1 + γ1) r
, (11)
where λ = r−µ+β1
r−µ
. Given equation (9), the value of PSD C is
U (x) =
1
1− θ
[
β0
r
− β1x
r − µ −
(
x
AB
)−γ1 (β0
r
− β1AB
r − µ − (1− θ) (AB − ρ(AB))
)]
(12)
When β1 = 0, formulas (10) and (12) correspond to the fixed coupon case with C = β0.
5 Ratings-based PSD
In practice, PSD contracts are usually written in terms of performance measures such as credit
ratings and financial ratios. In the Appendix we show that the results we derived in Section 3
for asset-based PSD obligations are also true for PSD obligations based on general performance
measures. In this section, we specifically consider PSD obligations based on the company’s credit
rating. We assume throughout the section that the asset process follows a geometric Brownian
motion and that the bankruptcy cost ρ(A) is proportional to the asset level at the time of default.
Credit ratings differ from other measures because of the circularity issues that are imposed. In
a ratings-based PSD obligation, the rating determines the coupon rate, which affects the optimal
default decision of the issuer. This, in turn, influences the rating. In this section, we derive a
valuation formula for ratings-based PSD that deals with these circularity issues. The value of
ratings-based PSD is the unique solution of a fixed-point problem.
We consider I different credit ratings, 1, . . . , I, with 1 the highest (“Aaa” in Moody’s ranking)
and I the lowest (“C” in Moody’s ranking). We let Rt denote the issuer’s credit rating at time t.
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We say that C ∈ RI is a ratings-based PSD obligation if it pays interest at the rate Ci whenever
Rt = i, with Ci+1 ≥ Ci > 0, for i in {1, . . . , I − 1}. Thus, a ratings-based PSD is more risk
compensating than a fixed-coupon PSD.
We assume that the rating agency assigns credit ratings based on the probability of default
over a given time horizon T .14 Naturally, higher ratings correspond to lower default probabilities.
The default time for a ratings-based PSD is a stopping time of the form τ(AB) = inf{s :
As ≤ AB}, for some AB . Therefore, the current asset level At is a sufficient statistic for
P (τ(AB) ≤ T | Ft), for any T ≥ t. A rating policy is thus given by some G : R 7→ RI+1
that maps a default boundary AB into rating transition thresholds, such that Rt = i whenever
At ∈ [Gi+1(AB), Gi(AB)). In our setting, this policy has the form15
G(AB) = AB g, (13)
where g ∈ RI is such that g1 = +∞, gI+1 = 1, and gi ≥ gi+1.
The results developed for step-up PSD can be applied to ratings-based PSD. In particular,
the maximum-equity-valuation problem (4) is solved by τ(AB) = inf{s : As ≤ AB}, where AB
solves equation (30).
Plugging (13) into (30), we obtain
AB =
γ1
(γ1 + 1)r
Ĉ, (14)
where
Ĉ =
I∑
i=1
[(
1
gi+1
)−γ2
−
(
1
gi
)−γ2]
ci,
and ci = (1− θ)Ci. We note that the ratings-based PSD issue C has the same default boundary
AB as that of a fixed-coupon bond paying coupons at the rate Ĉ.
Plugging (14) into (26)-(29), (21), and (6), we obtain closed-form expressions for the market
value W of equity and the market value U of debt for any ratings-based PSD obligation.
14Standard and Poor’s assigns ratings based on the probability of default. Moody’s assigns ratings based on the
recovery rate and probability of default. Conditional on a particular recovery rate, the credit rating depends only
on the probability of default.
15Since At is a geometric Brownian motion, its first-passage time distribution is an inverse Gaussian:
P (τ (AB) ≤ T | Ft) = 1− Φ
(
m(T − t)− x
σ
√
T − t
)
+ e
2mx
σ2 Φ
(
x+m(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
,
where, x = ln
(
AB
At
)
, m = µ − 1
2
σ2, At is the current level of assets, and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution
function. Since P (τ (AB) ≤ T | Ft) depends on At only through ABAt , we have the linearity of G( · ).
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We now derive the inefficiency theorem for the case of ratings-based PSD. We keep the same
definitions as in Section 3, except that the performance measure now corresponds to credit ratings,
and not asset levels.
Theorem 3 Suppose C and D are ratings-based PSD, satisfying UC0 = U
D
0 and Condition 1. If
C is more risk compensating than D, then C is less efficient than D.
Corollary 2 Let C be a ratings-based PSD issue satisfying Condition 1. If C is not constant, it
is less efficient than any fixed-interest PSD issue raising the same amount of cash and satisfying
Condition 3.
The above valuation results allow us to numerically assess the inefficiency resulting from
the issuance of ratings-based PSD, compared to standard debt. We report the absolute and
relative differences in debt value and rating triggers of ratings-based PSD and standard debt on
Figure 3. Ratings thresholds are computed by inversion of smoothed one-year risk-neutral default
probabilities taken from Driessen (2005).
In the first computation, we compare default triggering levels of ratings-based PSD and stan-
dard debt with identical market value. The second computation compares the market value of
ratings-based PSD and standard debt with identical default threshold. In both computations,
parameters are fixed as follows: r = 6%, µ = 2%, σ = 25%. Asset value is normalized to 100.
Debt value, coupon differentials, and default triggering levels are expressed as a percentage of
asset level. The lowest coupon, which corresponds to AAA debt, is fixed at 40 basis points above
r. The x-axis represents the gap cmax − cmin; hence the steepness of the ratings-based PSD. The
case cmax − cmin = 0 corresponds to standard debt. As Figure 3 indicates, a spread in coupon
rate between AAA-debt and CCC-debt of 100 basis points16 increases default triggering level by
3% compared to standard debt with identical market value, and decreases market value by 1.2%
compared to standard debt with identical default triggering level.
[Figure 3 about here.]
6 PSD as a Screening Device
Thus far, we have shown that more risk-compensating PSD is less efficient than fixed-coupon debt
when market frictions are limited to tax benefits and bankruptcy costs. This result is robust, as it
16This is the median spread across loans with performance pricing provisions in the sample of bank loan contracts
analyzed in Section 7.
12
holds for a general class of cash-flow processes and performance measures. Despite this inefficiency,
risk-compensating PSD obligations are widely used in practice. In this section, we show that PSD
can be optimally used as a screening device in a setting with asymmetric information between
the manager of the firm and the bank.
A firm needs to raise a fixed amount M of capital at time zero to finance some investment.
We assume for simplicity that the firm’s cash-flow process is a geometric Brownian motion. The
initial cash flow δ0 and the volatility σ are publicly known. The future growth rate (drift) of
the cash-flow process, which depends on the quality of the firm’s investment opportunities, is
either low µL or high µH , µH > µL. Given the initial cash flow δ0, the initial asset levels are
AL = δ0/ (r − µL) for the low-growth firm and AH = δ0/ (r − µH) for the high-growth firm. We
assume that M < AL, so that even the low-growth firm can raise this amount. We assume that
if the firm does not undertake the investment, the firm’s growth rate is sufficiently low so that it
is optimal for the low-growth firm to raise M and invest.
The growth rate is known to the manager of the firm and to the existing shareholders. The
market and the bank observe the cash-flow realizations δt of the firm, but are not able to ob-
serve the firm’s growth rate directly. The firm’s market capitalization, which reflects this partial
information, may thus be different from the firm’s actual equity value. The manager maximizes
a weighted average of equity value W and market capitalization Wˆ : ϕW + (1− ϕ) Wˆ , where
0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1.17 Since the default happens when the shareholders stop supporting the financially
distressed firm, the default time should not depend on ϕ, as long as the shareholders maximize
the intrinsic value of the firm. For simplicity, we assume that the firm has no debt outstanding
and no cash reserves at time zero and there are no tax benefits associated with debt.18
Banks can offer a menu of contracts to screen firms by their type. For simplicity, we restrict our
attention to the class of linear asset-based PSD C1 (A) = β0 − β1A, with β1 ≥ 0, which includes
fixed-interest debt (β1 = 0). According to Theorem 2, keeping the market value constant, an
increase in β1 makes a linear PSD obligation more risk compensating and less efficient.
We construct a separating equilibrium in which banks offer a menu of contracts consisting of
a fixed-interest debt obligation C0 and a risk-compensating PSD obligation C1, such that
UC1H (AH) = U
C0
L (AL) =M.
17This assumption is standard in the literature. See, for example, Ross (1977) and Miller and Rock (1985).
18Our argument could be extended to a setting with a more complex capital structure and tax benefits of
debt. Considering an all-equity firm with no cash reserves, however, significantly simplifies the presentation of our
argument.
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The low-growth firm chooses to take the fixed-interest loan, while the high-growth firm chooses
to take the risk-compensating PSD loan.
In this equilibrium, if the low-growth firm deviates and chooses the risk-compensating PSD
obligation, it will be perceived as a high-growth firm. That is, the market believes that the asset
level of this firm at time t is A′t = δt/ (r − µH), whereas its actual asset level is At = δt/ (r − µL) <
A′t. The interest payment for the low-growth firm in deviation before the growth rate is revealed
is given by
C ′1 (At) = C1
(
A′t
)
= C1
(
r − µL
r − µHAt
)
= β0 − β′1At,
where
β′1 = β1
r − µL
r − µH . (15)
Therefore, issuing C1 means that the low-growth firm will be actually paying C
′
1 (At) = β0−β′1At.
Even if the low-growth firm is perceived by the market as the high-growth firm, it will make higher
interest payments on the PSD than the high-growth firm. This is because the perceived asset
level depends on the observable cash flows δt, which are likely to be lower for the low-growth firm.
If the low-growth firm issues PSD C1, it will be perceived as the high-growth firm, and the
market value of its equity will be equal to WC1H (AH) after the issuance. Thus, the incentive
compatibility constraints are given by
WC0L (AL) ≥ ϕW
C′1
L (AL) + (1− ϕ)WC1H (AH) (16)
for the low-growth firm, and
WC1H (AH) ≥ ϕWC0H (AH) + (1− ϕ)WC0L (AL) (17)
for the high-growth firm. Among the pairs (C0, C1) of contracts that satisfy (16) and (17), we
select the contract C1 with the smallest β1.
With the above menu of contracts banks make zero profit and have no profitable deviations.
High-growth firms choose the risk-compensating PSD C1, while low-growth firms choose the fixed-
interest debt C0. The proposed menu of contracts is thus a separating equilibrium of the screening
game.
Risk-compensating PSD screens different types through different coupon payments, not through
bankruptcy costs. The firm issuing a risk-compensating PSD commits to pay a higher coupon in
the future, if it turns out that its type is not what it says.19
19We note that the debt issued by the firm is risky even when there are no bankruptcy costs. Indeed, for fixed-
coupon bond C0, the recovery value AB =
γ1C0
(1+γ1)r
is less than C0/r. In addition, the coupon rate on PSD C1
directly depends on the stochastic asset level.
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Theorem 4 If the bankruptcy cost is zero and
ϕ ≥ AH −AL
AH −M , (18)
there exists a screening equilibrium in which the high-growth firm issues a risk-compensating PSD,
while the low-growth firm issues fixed-interest debt.
Theorem 4 demonstrates that a risk-compensating PSD obligation can be used as a screening
device even when the bankruptcy cost is zero. Since AL > M , Condition (18) is always satisfied
when the manager’s incentives are perfectly aligned with those of equityholders (i.e. ϕ = 1).
We prove Theorem 4 by explicitly constructing a risk-compensating PSD that i) has market
value M if issued by the high-growth firm, and ii) requires such high interest payments in case of
low performance that the low-growth firm would prefer to default immediately if it had to issue
it, hence forgoing all of its assets to the debtholders of the firm. Since these assets add up to
AL > M , if condition (18) is satisfied, then the manager of a low-growth firm prefers to issue the
fixed-rate rate with market value M , which results in the wished separation.
Example We use the following parameters to demonstrate the properties of the screening equi-
librium:
r = 0.05, σ = 0.2, µL = 0, µH = 0.02, ρ (AB) = 0.5AB , δ0 = 5, M = 50, ϕ = 1.
In the separating equilibrium, the high-growth firm issues C∗1 (A) = 4.2461 − 0.0051A. The
low-growth firm is indifferent between issuingC0 and C
∗
1 , and its equity value isW
C0
L (AL) = 45.15.
In contrast, issuing C∗1 increases the equity value of the high-growth firm from 105.87 to 113.91.
The market value of PSD C∗1 is less sensitive than C0 to the type of the issuing firm. The
value of C0 issued by the high-growth firm is 58.86 vs. 50, when C0 is issued by the low-growth
firm. In contrast, if the low-growth firm issues C∗1 , the actual value of C
∗
1 would be 48.23, which
is fairly close to 50. Consistent with the pecking-order theory, the high-growth firm issues the less
information sensitive obligation C∗1 .
7 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we provide empirical support to the screening hypothesis developed in Section 6
using bank loan data.20
20Firms also issue public performance-sensitive debt, in the form of step-up bonds. See, for example, Houweling,
Mentink, and Vorst (2004) for an empirical study of step-up bonds. Performance-sensitive debt is, however, more
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Data Description We obtain bank loan data from Thompson Financial’s SDC database.
We obtain additional financial information for the borrowers from COMPUSTAT and CRSP
databases.
From the SDC database, we collect data on deals to public firms from 1995 to 2005. We
exclude from our sample debt contracts without information on loan size and loan maturity. Of
the remaining loans, we exclude any loan to a firm that does not have a credit rating available
in Compustat both for the closing date of the loan and also for one year after the closing date of
the loan. Our final sample has 5, 020 loans.
Our analysis is done at the loan deal level. A loan deal may contain more than one loan
tranche. In our sample, 31% of the loan deals contain more than one tranche. A deal-level
analysis, as opposed to a tranche-level analysis, is appropriate because it may be enough for one
tranche of a deal to have performance pricing provisions for a firm to signal its type to the market.
In addition, because multiple tranches of the same loan deal cannot be treated as independent
observations, a tranche-level analysis produces standard errors that are improperly small. In our
analysis, the size and maturity of a loan are calculated at the deal level.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the borrowing firms and structure of the loan contracts
in our sample.21 The table is divided into contracts that have performance pricing provisions and
those that do not have performance pricing provisions. In our sample, 40% of the loans have
performance pricing provisions. This shows that performance-sensitive debt is an important but
not universal part of the bank loan market. Among loans with performance pricing provisions, the
median number of steps is five and the median spread in interest paid by the lowest and highest
credit rating is 70 basis points.
[Table 1 about here.]
Looking further into the characteristics of loan contracts, we find that in our sample credit
rating is the most commonly used performance measure. Approximately 52% of the loans con-
taining performance pricing provisions are based on credit ratings of the borrowing firm. Other
commonly used measures are leverage, debt/cash flow ratio, interest coverage ratio, debt/net
worth ratio, EBITDA.
Model Specification Our screening model predicts that issuing performance-sensitive debt
conveys information to the market that the firm is of a high-growth type. To test this hypothesis,
prevalent in bank loans.
21Table 6 in the Appendix explains how all the variables are constructed.
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we estimate the following ordered probit model:
∆Rating(t + 4) = α+ β1 PSD+β2X + β3Y + . (19)
The left-hand-side variable reflects changes in the credit rating of the borrower one year after
the loan closing date. It can take three values: 0 if after one year the borrower has the same rate
as when the deal was closed, 1 if the borrower has been upgraded, −1 if the borrower has been
downgraded. The key right-hand-side variable of interest is PSD, which is a dummy variable that
is equal to one when the loan has performance pricing provisions. The key coefficient of interest
is β1, which measures how the presence of performance pricing provisions is correlated with the
future changes in the credit rating of the borrowing firm. Our hypothesis is that β1 is positive,
meaning that after the deal is closed, firms with performance-sensitive loans are more likely to
experience positive changes in their credit rating than firms with fixed-interest loans. The variable
X includes a variety of controls for other loan characteristics, while the variable Y includes a
variety of controls for firm characteristics. Finally, all standard errors are heteroskedacity robust,
and clustered at the borrowing firm.
Results The results in Table 2 support the screening hypothesis outlined above. Firms with
performance-sensitive loans are more likely to have a higher credit rating one year after the loan
closing date than firms with fixed-interest loans. The results are significant at the 5% statistical
level. In terms of magnitudes, the results in column (1) imply that firms that have PSD are 22.9%
less likely to be downgraded and 20.1% more likely to be upgraded one year after the closing date
of the loan than firms that have fixed-interest loans.
[Table 2 about here.]
Analyzing the estimated coefficients of the control variables also yields some interesting results.
For example, the coefficients on loan size and average maturity imply that larger size and shorter
maturity loans increase the likelihood of an upgrade and decrease the likelihood of a downgrade.
This is consistent with asymmetric information models in which firms signal their type through
debt level (Ross (1977)) and maturity (Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991)). Finally, size and
market-to-book ratio have a negative impact on future ratings, while return volatility has a
positive impact on future ratings.
Table 3 shows that the results are robust to different time horizons of the dependent variable.
If, in our screening model, the rating agency understands the separating equilibrium, then the
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credit rating must immediately reflect the positive information about the borrower’s type conveyed
by PSD issuance. However, even if the rating agency ignores (unlike investors) the informational
value of PSD issuance, credit ratings should gradually reflect the high-growth type of the firm,
as its cash flows evolve according to a higher drift than those of a low-growth firm. As Table 3
illustrates, the effects of PSD loans on the credit rating of the company become gradually more
significant as we move further away from the deal closing date, suggesting that it takes time for
credit rating agencies to incorporate information into their ratings.
[Table 3 about here.]
Is the effect of PSD on credit ratings the same across firms of different credit quality? To
answer this question we add to our model specification an interaction term between the PSD
dummy and the credit rating of the borrowing firm at the loan closing date. Table 4 shows
that the coefficient associated with this interaction term is not significantly different from zero.
This result suggests that the screening mechanism works equally well for firms of different credit
qualities.
[Table 4 about here.]
Finally, for a robustness check, we extend our analysis to study the relation between PSD
and future return on assets (ROA) growth of the borrowing firm. For that we use the same
specification as above with the variable ∆ROA(t+k) in place of the variable ∆Rating(t+k). The
variable ∆ROA(t + k) is equal to 1 if the borrowing firm cash flow scaled by total assets grows
in the first k quarters after the deal closing date and 0 otherwise. According to our model, the
ROA of firms that issue PSD are more likely to grow after the deal is closed than the ROA of
firms that issue fixed-interest debt. Table 5 shows that firms that issue PSD are more likely to
experience ROA growth in the two and four quarters following the deal closing date.
[Table 5 about here.]
Another empirical implication of our signaling model is that the equity price should react
positively to the issuance of PSD. We do not test this prediction, however. It is difficult to
measure stock reaction at time of issuance directly, since we do not know exactly when the
market learns about performance-pricing covenants. This information may leak before the deal
is closed when the contract is being negotiated, may be disclosed at the time the deal is closed,
or may be disclosed with some delay.
[Table 6 about here.]
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8 Additional Discussion
Section 6 showed that PSD can be used as a screening device when there is asymmetric information
between investors and the borrowing firm. This section considers other motivations to issue PSD
and relates our results to empirical findings and possible extensions.
Moral hazard can justify the use of risk-compensating PSD. A scheme that punishes bad
performance with higher interest rates could serve as an additional incentive for the firm’s manager
to exert effort. It could also discourage the manager from undertaking inefficient investments.
Tchistyi (2009) shows that risk-compensating performance pricing can be part of an optimal
contract in a situation in which the manager of the firm can privately divert the firm’s cash
flows for his own consumption at the expense of outside investors. Bhanot and Mello (2006)
show that rating triggers that increase coupon rates are in general inefficient in preventing asset
substitution.22
Contracting costs may be another reason for some types of PSD. When the credit quality
of the borrower changes, the issuer and the investors in its debt often get involved in costly
negotiation over the terms of the debt. Some types of PSD may resolve the renegotiation problem
by automatically adjusting the interest rates.
Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) provide empirical evidence that private debt contracts are
more likely to include performance pricing schemes that increase interest rates in times of poor
performance when agency costs associated with asymmetric information, moral hazard, or recon-
tracting costs are significant. In their sample, over 70% of commercial loans have performance
pricing provisions.
We have assumed throughout the paper that all the agents in the economy are risk neutral. It
is straightforward, however, to extend our results to the case of risk-averse agents, in the absence
of arbitrage (specifically, assuming the existence of an equivalent martingale measure).
If markets are incomplete, performance-sensitive debt might be issued to meet the demands
of risk-averse investors, providing them with hedge against credit deterioration of the firm. Our
results suggest, however that financial guarantors, rather than the debt issuing firms, should be
providing this kind of hedge.
For simplicity we assumed that the tax benefits are proportional to the coupon payments.
This is a standard assumption in the structural model literature. In practice, the tax benefits are
22Bhanot and Mello (2006) also demonstrate that rating triggers that force early payment of debt can prevent
asset substitution.
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lower in the states with negative net cash flows. However, this makes our efficiency results even
stronger.
9 Conclusion
Using an endogenous default model, we develop a method of valuing different types of performance-
sensitive debt and prove that, given the same initial funds raised by sale of debt, more risk-
compensating PSD leads to earlier default and consequently lowers the market value of the issuing
firm’s equity. Despite its inefficiency, risk-compensating PSD is a widespread form of financing.
To explain the existence of PSD obligations, we propose a screening model in which the future
growth rate of the firm is unknown to the market but known to the firm’s manager. We show that
there exists a separating equilibrium in which the high-growth firm issues a risk-compensating
PSD obligation, while the low-growth firm issues fixed-interest debt. Controlling for firm and loan
characteristics, we find empirically that firms whose loans contain performance pricing provisions
are more likely to be upgraded and less likely to be downgraded one year after the closing date
of the loan than firms with fixed-interest loans.
In the paper, we have discussed PSD obligations that have explicit performance pricing provi-
sions, such as step-up bonds, performance-pricing loans, and catastrophe bonds. However, PSD
obligations may be implicitly performance-dependent. For example, with short-term debt, such as
commercial paper, the coupon rises and falls continuously with the credit quality of the borrower.
Performance-sensitive debt may also result from an optimal dynamic capital structure strategy.
In a setting with taxes and bankruptcy costs, the optimal amount of debt outstanding varies with
asset level. When the asset level increases, issuers are better off issuing more debt, since this gives
them higher tax benefits. On the other hand, when the asset level decreases, debt reductions are
optimal, ignoring transaction costs, as they reduce the present value of bankruptcy costs. The
net effect, under some conditions, is PSD.23 We believe that our model is useful in understanding
these types of PSD obligations.
23This setting is studied in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (1998).
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10 Appendix
10.1 Technical Conditions
We assume a fixed probability space (Ω,F , P ) in which the filtration (Ft) is generated by the
standard Brownian motion B. For the diffusions to be well defined, we assume that drift and
volatility functions are continuous and bounded (see Karatzas and Shreve (1991)). For the asset
value to be finite, we assume that the growth rate function µδ is uniformly less than r − ε for
some constant ε > 0.
The results of the paper also assume the following technical conditions, whose intuitive justi-
fications are described in the main text.
Condition 2 µ and σ imply the existence of a unique strong solution of (1).24
Condition 3 There exist levels x
¯
< x¯ and a positive constant c
¯
such that
1. (1− θ)C(x) ≥ δ(x) if and only if x ≤ x¯.
2. (1− θ)C(x) ≥ δ(x) + c
¯
for x ≤ x
¯
.
Condition 4 The PSD obligation C is such that:
1. There exist non-negative constants k1 and k2 that satisfy
0 ≤ (1− θ)C(y) ≤ k1 + k2y.
2. C is right continuous on [0,∞) and has left limits on (0,∞).
10.2 Example: Step-Up PSD
We assume that the asset process is a geometric Brownian motion as in Section 4. Step-up
performance-sensitive debt is defined as a PSD obligation whose coupon payment is a non-
increasing step function of the asset level. For a decreasing sequence {Gi}I+1i=1 of asset levels
such that G1 = +∞ and GI+1 = AB , the coupon rate of a step-up PSD obligation can be
represented as
C (At) = C¯i whenever At ∈ [Gi+1, Gi), (20)
24This condition holds if µ and σ are continuously differentiable and bounded and σ is uniformly bounded below
by some positive constant. Weaker conditions guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of a solution to (1) can be
considered as well, which would allow for example square-root processes. See Yamada and Watanabe (1971).
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where {C¯i}Ii=1 is an increasing sequence of constant coupon rates. With this coupon structure,
the general solution of the ODE (8) is
W (x) =
 0, x ≤ AB ,L(1)i x−γ1 + L(2)i x−γ2 + x− (1−θ)C¯ir , Gi+1 ≤ x ≤ Gi , (21)
for i = 2, . . . , I + 1, where γ1 =
m+
√
m2 + 2rσ2
σ2
, γ2 =
m−√m2 + 2rσ2
σ2
, m = µ− σ
2
2
, and
where L
(1)
i and L
(2)
i are constants to be determined shortly. According to Theorem 1,
W (AB) = 0 (22)
and
W ′ (AB) = 0 , (23)
and W (·) is continuously differentiable. In particular, for i = 2, . . . , I,
W (Gi−) =W (Gi+) , W ′ (Gi−) =W ′ (Gi+) . (24)
Because the market value of equity is non-negative and cannot exceed the asset value,25
L
(2)
1 = 0. (25)
The system (22)-(25) has 2I+1 equations with 2I+1 unknowns (L
(j)
i , j ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ {1, . . . , I},
and AB). Substituting (21) into (22)-(25) and solving gives
L
(1)
I =
(γ2 + 1)AB − γ2 c2r
(γ1 − γ2)A−γ1B
, (26)
L
(2)
I =
− (γ1 + 1)AB + γ1 c2r
(γ1 − γ2)A−γ2B
, (27)
L
(1)
j = L
(1)
I +
γ2
(γ1 − γ2)r
I−1∑
i=j
ci+1 − ci
G−γ1i+1
, j = 2, . . . , I , (28)
L
(2)
j = L
(2)
I −
γ1
(γ1 − γ2)r
I−1∑
i=j
ci+1 − ci
G−γ2i+1
, j = 2, . . . , I , (29)
0 = − (γ1 + 1)AB + γ1
r
(
cI −
I−1∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)
(
AB
Gi+1
)−γ2)
, (30)
where, for convenience, we let ci ≡ (1− θ)C¯i.
25Since γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0, the term L
2
Kx
−γ2 would necessarily dominate the other terms in the equation (21)
violating the inequality 0 ≤W (x) ≤ x, unless L21 = 0.
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10.3 General Performance Measures
We assume that performance measures reflect the borrower’s capacity and willingness to repay the
debt. With µ and σ given, the borrower’s asset level At and chosen default triggering boundary
AB fully determine its default characteristics at any time t. Since AB is not directly observed by
outsiders, the performance measure pit is a function p¯i(At, A˜B), where A˜B is the perceived default
triggering level of assets.
A PSD obligation C therefore pays the coupon C(pit) = C(p¯i(At, A˜B)). The Markov structure
and the time homogeneity of the setting imply that any optimal default time of the firm can26
be simplified to a default triggering boundary hitting time τ(AB). In this setting, a consistency
problem arises, as the default triggering level chosen by the firm may depend on the perceived
default triggering level. With y denoting the actual default triggering level of the firm, the value
of the equity is
W˜ (x, y, A˜B) = Ex
[∫ τ(y)
0
e−rt
[
δt(At)− (1− θ)C(p¯i(At, A˜B))
]
dt
]
.
Knowing that the firm seeks to maximize the value of the equity, the rating agency therefore
chooses an A˜B that solves the fixed point equation:
AB ∈ argmax
y≤x
W˜ (x, y,AB). (31)
This equation may have one or several solutions, or no solution at all. To avoid ambiguity, we
impose the following condition.
Condition 5 There exists a unique positive solution of equation (31).
Given Condition 5, the coupon rate paid by the PSD obligation at time t is C(p¯i(At, AB)).
Since AB does not change over time, this PSD, which is defined under performance measure pi,
is equivalent to an asset-based PSD C˜, defined by C˜ (At) ≡ C(p¯i(At, AB)). Equation (31) implies
that C and C˜ have the same optimal default boundary AB . Hence, provided that C˜ satisfies
Condition 1, we can compare C in terms of efficiency with asset-based PSD obligations that
satisfy the same conditions by applying Theorem 2. In particular, if C˜ (At) is a nonincreasing
non-negative function, then a fixed-coupon bond with the same market value is more efficient
than C. This proves the following theorem.27
26In this section, we assume that technical conditions 3 and 4, used in Section 2, hold.
27If pi takes a finitely many values, then C˜ (At) automatically satisfies conditions 3 and 4 of the Appendix.
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Theorem 5 Suppose that a performance measure pi can take only a finite number of values, and
that a PSD C is nonincreasing and nonnegative. Suppose Conditions 1 and 5 are satisfied. Then,
a fixed-coupon PSD D that satisfies Condition 1, and has the same market value as C (UC0 = U
D
0 ),
is more efficient than C.
10.4 Proofs
We first justify the existence of an increasing function δ such that δt = δ(At). Since Et [δs] is
increasing28 in δt, At(·) is increasing in δt, which implies the existence of a continuous inverse
function δ : R → R such that δt = δ(At).
We now show that the optimal default policy takes the form of a default triggering level. The
value of equity is:
W (A0) ≡ sup
τ̂∈T
E
[∫ τ̂
0
e−rt [δ(At)− (1− θ)C (At)] dt
]
.
The Markov property and time homogeneity imply that there exist asset levels AB and AH
with AB < A0 < AH , such that an optimal default time of the firm is of the form τ
∗ =
min(τ(AB), τ(AH )), where τ(x) ≡ inf {t : At = x}. Even though the existence of an upper asset
boundary AH above which the firm would default is mathematically possible, this unnatural pos-
sibility is excluded by Condition 3. The first part of Condition 3 states that for asset levels higher
than x¯, the cash flow rate is higher than the coupon payment rate. It can be easily verified that,
under this condition, AH = +∞, so that the optimal default time simplifies to τ∗ = τ(AB). The
second part of Condition 3 ensures that the company will default at some positive asset level.
Lemma 1 Under Condition 3, there exists a level x˜ such that any optimal default time τ satisfies
τ ≤ τ(x˜) almost surely.
The proof of the lemma is based on the following result.
Claim There exists a level x˜ such that ∀x ≤ x˜, W (x) = sup
τ
W (x, τ) = 0.
Proof. From Condition 3, there exist positive constants x
¯
and c
¯
such that (1− θ)C(x) > δ(x) + c
¯
28Et [δs] is increasing in δt because, given any path of the underlying Brownian motion, the trajectory of the cash
flow process starting at point δ′t > δt will be always above the trajectory of the cash flow process starting at δt.
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for all x ≤ x
¯
. Let Ξ = sup
τ
W (x
¯
, τ) <∞. For any stopping time τ and x < x
¯
,
W (x, τ) = Ex
[
1τ<τ(x
¯
)
∫ τ
0
e−rt (δ(At)− (1− θ)C(At)) dt
]
+Ex
[
1τ>τ(x
¯
)
∫ τ
0
e−rt (δ(At)− (1− θ)C(At)) dt
]
≤ − c¯
r
Ex[
(
1− e−rτ) 1τ<τ(x
¯
)]
+Ex
{[
− c¯
r
(
1− e−rτ(x¯)
)
+ ξ(x, x
¯
)Ξ
]
1τ>τ(x
¯
)
}
.
Let x∗ > 0 be the unique solution (in x) of −c
r¯
(
1− e−rτ(x¯)
)
+ξ(x, x
¯
)Ξ = 0. Since ξ is nondecreas-
ing in x, we have for all x ≤ x˜ = x
¯
∧ x∗, W (x, τ) ≤ −c
r¯
E[(1− e−rτ ) 1τ<τ(x˜)] ≤ 0, the optimum
W (x, τ) = 0 being reached for τ ≡ 0. This claim proves that, starting from any level x and for any
stopping time τ , the stopping time τ− = τ ∧ τ(x˜) is at least as good as τ . In other words, we can
restrict ourselves, in our search for optimality, to the set of stopping times T˜ = {τ s.t. τ ≤ τ(x˜)}.
Proof of Theorem 1. By the strong Markov property of the asset process,
W˜ (x, y) = f(x)− ξ(x, y)f(y) (32)
for x ≥ y and W˜ (x, y) = 0 for x < y, where29
ξ(x, y) = Ex[e
−τ(y)],
29Previous assumptions on µ and σ imply that ξ is well defined, continuous, differentiable for x 6= y, with left
and right derivatives at x = y, and less than 1 (see Karatzas and Shreve (1991)). Theorem 1, which exploits the
smooth-pasting property, requires that the default triggering level be reached with positive probability. This is
always the case if σ is coercive (see Fleming and Soner (1993) for a detailed treatment). Otherwise, ξ(x, y) and
W (x, y) may be discontinuous. In such case, the procedure described in Theorem 1 can be adapted as follows.
If the current cash-flow rate is δ (supposed high enough that default does not occur at δ – e.g. if the net payoff
rate is positive), let δ¯ denote the smallest cash-flow level below δ that can be reached in finite time with positive
probability. If the smooth-pasting approach yields a default triggering boundary strictly above δ¯, then it is valid.
Otherwise, default may only occur at δ¯, since the cash-flow rate cannot go below that level. It then suffices to
determine whether it is optimal to default at δ¯, which can be done easily, for example, if the cash flow process has
zero volatility. Otherwise, the default decision at δ¯ may still be determined directly, and one must differentiate the
case in which δ¯ is an absorbing state and that in which it is a reflecting state. In the former case, the value function
can be easily computed at δ¯, while in the latter case, default cannot be optimal at δ¯, otherwise a higher default
boundary would have existed. Another approach to dealing with processes where volatility vanishes is to solve
an approximate problem where the volatility is everywhere positive and coercive, and take the limit as volatility
converges to the initial problem.
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and
f(x) = Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt [δ(At)− (1− θ)C(At)] dt
]
.
f(x) is the present value of equity if initial asset level is x and shareholders never default (τ =∞).
We first prove necessity of the conditions stated by Theorem 1, then their sufficiency.
1. The proof of the necessary conditions is based a series of lemmas:
Lemma 2 Under Conditions 2–4, f is continuously differentiable and f ′ is bounded and left and
right differentiable. Moreover, f satisfies the following equations:
1
2σ
2(x)f ′′l (x) + µ(x)f
′(x)− rf(x) + δ(x) − (1− θ)Cl(x) = 0
1
2σ
2(x)f ′′r (x) + µ(x)f
′(x)− rf(x) + δ(x) − (1− θ)C(x) = 0
, (33)
where f ′′l (x) (resp. f
′′
r (x)) is the left (resp. right) derivative of f
′ at x, and Cl(x) is the left limit
of C at x.
Proof ¿From Condition 2, there exists a fundamental solution30 ζ(x, s, y, t) with the same gen-
erator as {At}t≥0, such that for s < t,
Px,s[At ∈ B] =
∫
B
ζ(x, s, y, t)dy
for any Borel subset B of R and
1
2
σ2(x)
∂2ζ
∂x2
(x, s, y, t) + µ(x)
∂ζ
∂x
(x, s, y, t) +
∂ζ
∂s
(x, s, y, t) = 0. (34)
If C is continuous, letting φ(x) = δ(x) − (1− θ)C(x), Friedman (1975) and an application of the
Fubini theorem imply that
f(x) =
∫
R
φ(y)
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtζ(x, 0, y, t)dt
]
dy,
which, by time homogeneity of {At}t≥0, implies that
f(x) =
∫
R
φ(y)
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtζ(x,−t, y, 0)dt
]
dy. (35)
When C is discontinuous, the second part of Condition 4 implies that there is a countably finite
number of discontinuities. A limit argument using approximating continuous functions then shows
that (35) also holds in this case. To derive an ODE when C is continuous, a straightforward
30See Friedman (1975).
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differentiation of (35) using (34) shows (33), which boils down to a single equation at any continuity
point. When C is discontinuous, differentiation applied to all continuity points of C shows that
(33) holds at such points, while right and left limit arguments at discontinuity points show that
(33) holds at these points as well. The boundedness of f ′ comes from the boundedness of ∂ζ
∂x
(x, v),
proved in Friedman (1975), and the fact that µδ is uniformly bounded away from r.
Corollary 3 W satisfies the following equations on (AB ,∞):
1
2
σ2(x)W ′′l (x) + µ(x)W
′(x)− rW (x) + δ(x) − (1− θ)Cl(x) = 0 (36)
1
2
σ2(x)W ′′r (x) + µ(x)W
′(x)− rW (x) + δ(x) − (1− θ)C(x) = 0, (37)
where W ′′l (x) (resp. W
′′
r (x)) is the left (resp. right) derivative of W
′ at x, and Cl(x) is the left
limit of C at x. In particular, W solves ODE (8) at any continuity point of C.
Proof From Lemma 2 and (32), Wˆ (x, y) is continuous with respect to y. From Lemma 1, and
compactness of [0, x] there exists a level AB > 0 such that W (x) = Wˆ (x,AB). The proof is then
straightforward from Lemma 2 and (32).
Corollary 4 If a PSD obligation C satisfies Conditions 2–4, then W˜ (x, y) is continuously dif-
ferentiable in both components for x > y, and ∂W˜
∂x
is left and right differentiable in x.
Proof This comes directly from the Lemma 2 and (32).
Corollary 5 For x 6= AB, W is differentiable and W ′ is bounded on [0,∞).
Proof Straightforward, from Corollary 4 and the facts that W (x) = W˜ (x,AB) and that f
′ is
bounded on [0,∞).
Lemma 3 If a PSD obligation C satisfies Conditions 2–4, then W is differentiable at AB and
W ′(AB) = 0.
Proof Optimality of AB implies that W˜y(x,AB) = 0 for all x > AB . Taking the right limit
of this expression, W˜y,r(AB , AB) = 0. Moreover, we have for any y, W˜ (y, y) = 0. Right-
differentiating this equation and evaluating at y = AB yields W˜x,r(AB , AB) + W˜y,r(AB , AB) = 0,
hence W˜x,r(AB , AB) = 0. Since the left derivative is also 0, this implies that W is differentiable
at AB , and that its derivative is zero.
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It remains to show that AB ≤ x¯, which is immediate since, for At > x¯, the cash flow rate exceeds
the coupon rate, implying that it is never optimal to default at this level.
2. The verification of the sufficient conditions is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.1 in Duffie
and Lando (2001). Define a stochastic process χt as
χt = e
−rtW (At) +
∫ t
0
e−rsφs ds ,
where for x > AB , W (x) is the solution of the ODE that satisfies all the conditions listed in the
theorem, and W (x) = 0 for x ≤ AB˙ .
Since W is C1, an application of Itoˆ’s formula leads to
dχt = e
−rtd (At) dt+ e
−rtW ′ (At)σ(At)dBt, (38)
where
d (x) ≡ 1
2
W ′′ (x)σ2(x) +W ′ (x)µ(x)− rW (x) + φ(x).
Since by assumption W ′ is bounded, the second term is a martingale, and since
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
(
e−rtW ′(At)σ(At)
)2
dt
]
<∞,
∫ t
0 e
−rsW ′ (As) σAs dBs is a uniformly integrable martingale, which implies that
Ex
[∫ τ
0
e−rsW ′ (As) σAs dBs
]
= 0
for any stopping time τ . By the assumptions of the theorem
φ (AB) ≤ 0. (39)
This inequality means that when the firm declares bankruptcy, its cash flow δ = (r − x)AB is less
than the coupon payment. It is easy to verify that the drift of χt is never positive: d(x) vanishes
for x > AB since W solves the ODE, and is negative for x < AB , because of the inequality (39)
and W (x) = 0 for x < AB. Because of the non-positive drift, for any stopping time T ∈ T ,
q0 ≥ E (χT ), meaning
W (A0) ≥ E
 T∫
0
e−rsφs ds+ e
−rTW (AT )
 .
For the stopping time τ , we have
W (A0) = E
 τ∫
0
e−rsφs ds
 ≥ E
 T∫
0
e−rsφs ds
 ,
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where the inequality follows from non-negativity of W . Therefore, the stopping time τ maximizes
the value of the equity.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Let C and D be asset-based PSD satisfying Conditions 2–4, and ACB ≤ ADB . If h ≡
C − D is not constant on [ADB ,∞) and changes sign at most once from positive to negative on
[ADB ,∞), then, WC0 (x) > WD0 (x) for any starting asset level x ∈ (ACB ,∞).
Proof First, assume that ACB = A
D
B = AB . Since h changes sign at most once from positive to
negative on [AB ,∞), there exist constants A1, A2 verifying AB ≤ A1 ≤ A2 and such that h > 0
for A ∈ [AB , A1), h = 0 for A ∈ (A1, A2), and h < 0 for A ∈ (A2,∞).31
We first consider the case where A1 = AB . Then necessarily A2 < ∞, otherwise h would be
constant on [AB ,∞). Thus, h vanishes on [AB , A2) and negative on (A2,∞). It is easy to verify
that for any PSD C with initial asset level x and defaulting boundary AB , we have
UC0 (x) = Ex
[∫ τ(AB)
0
e−rsC(As) ds
]
+ (AB − ρ (AB))ξ(A0, AB). (40)
Since (A2,∞) has a positive measure, (40) implies that UD0 (x) > UC0 (x) for all x ∈ (AB ,∞).
Equation (9) then allows one to conclude that WC0 (x) > W
D
0 (x) for all x ∈ (AB ,∞).
Now we consider the case in which A1 > AB . Thus, h(AB) > 0. We will first show that W
C
0 (x) >
WD0 (x) for all x ∈ (AB , A1). From equations (36) and (37), we have for H(x) ≡WC0 (x)−WD0 (x):
1
2
H ′′l (x)σ
2(x) +H ′(x)µ(x) − rH(x)− (1− θ)hl(x) = 0 (41)
1
2
H ′′r (x)σ
2(x) +H ′(x)µ(x)− rH(x)− (1− θ)h(x) = 0, (42)
where H ′′l (x) (resp. H
′′
r (x)) is the left (resp. right) derivative of H
′ at x, and hl(x) is the left
limit of h at x, which exists according to Condition 4 and Theorem 1. Also from Theorem
1, W i(AB) = 0 and (W
i)′(AB) = 0 for i = C,D. Therefore, H(AB) = H
′(AB) = 0. Since
h(AB) > 0, it follows from equation (42) that H
′′
r (AB) > 0. This implies that H
′(x) > 0 and
H(x) > 0 in a right neighborhood of AB . Precisely, there exists η > 0, such that H
′(x) > 0
and H(x) > 0 for x ∈ (AB , AB + η). We will now prove by contradiction that H ′(x) > 0 for all
x ≤ A1. Letting y denote the first time when H ′(y) = 0, we have necessarily H(y) > 0. From
equation (41) and the fact that h(y) ≥ 0 for y ≤ A1, it follows that H ′′l (y) > 0, contradicting the
31By convention [a,a) and (a,a) equal the empty set. The precise values at A1 and A2 are unimportant.
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fact that y was the first time where H ′(y) = 0. Therefore, H ′(x) > 0 and H(x) > 0 on (AB , A1].
Last, we prove that H(x) > 0 on (A1,∞). By definition of WC , WD, and AB , we have:
WC0 (x) = E
Q
x
[∫ τ∗
0
qt (δt − (1− θ)C (At)) dt
]
and
WD0 (x) = E
Q
x
[∫ τ∗
0
qt (δt − (1− θ)D (At)) dt
]
,
where qt = e
−rt, τ∗ = τ(AB). Therefore,
H(x) = −(1− θ)EQx
[∫ τ∗
0
qth(At)dt
]
.
It follows that for any x > A1, we have, since τ(A1) < τ(AB) = τ
∗ and
∫ τ∗
0 =
∫ τ(A1)
0 +
∫ τ∗
τ(A1)
,
H(x) = −(1− θ)EQx
[∫ τ(A1)
0
qth(At)
]
+ (1− θ)EQx (e−rτ(Ah))H(A1).
Since h(.) is non-positive on (A1,∞) and we have seen that H(A1) > 0, it follows that H(x) > 0
∀x ∈ (AB ,∞), which concludes the proof of the lemma in the case ACB = ADB = AB. Now we
consider the case where ACB < A
D
B . Then, W
C
0 (x) > 0 and W
D
0 (x) = 0 for x ∈ (ACB , ADB ], whence
the claim holds trivially on this interval. The rest of the proof is identical to the first part for
x > ADB .
The intuition for Lemma 4 is as follows. Suppose that ACB = A
D
B = A0. Since these default
levels are chosen optimally, this means that, seen from A0, the profiles C and D are equivalent
for the shareholders (both prompting them to default). As the asset level increases above A0,
shareholders get gradually farther away from relatively higher coupons C (compared to D), as C’s
payments decrease relative to D’s. Since shareholders were indifferent between C and D at A0,
this means that they now strictly prefer C to D. Thus, equity value is higher with C than with
D for all asset levels above A0. The intuition for the case A
C
B < A
D
B is the same but reinforced by
the fact that WC(ADB ) > 0 =W
D(ADB ). Lemma 4 allows us to conclude the proof of Theorem 2.
We proceed by contradiction. We assume first that ACB = A
D
B = AB. Then, the pair (C,D)
satisfies the conditions of the lemma, which allows to conclude that WC0 (x) > W
D
0 (x) ∀x > AB .
By formula (9), we conclude in particular that for x = A0, U
C
0 < U
D
0 , which contradicts the
hypothesis of Theorem 1. We now assume that ACB < A
D
B . Then, we can lower the value of the
interests paid by D uniformly, proceeding by translation: we consider the PSD Dε that pays the
interest function Dε = D− ε. Then, with the assumption that D is in the efficiency domain of its
translation class (Condition 1), we have UDε0 < U
D
0 = U
C
0 . On the other hand, since the interest
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payments are getting lower as ε increases, there exists an ε0 > 0 such that A
Dε0+
B ≤ ACB ≤ A
Dε0−
B .
Moreover, since h = C −D is non-increasing and not constant, so is hε ≡ C −Dε = C −D + ε.
In particular, hε is not constant and changes sign at most once. Since D satisfies Conditions 3
and 4, it is easy to verify that so does Dε, ∀ε > 0. Therefore, the pairs (C,Dε) with ε in a left
neighborhood of ε0 satisfy the hypothesis of the lemma, which implies
32 that WC0 (x) > W
Dε0
0 (x)
for any starting asset level x ∈ (ACB ,∞). By (6), we conclude that UC0 < UDε0 for any ε in a right
neighborhood of ε0, which contradicts the fact that U
Dε
0 ≤ UD0 = UC0 for all ε > 0.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is based on the proof of Theorem 2. In the case of ratings-based
PSD obligations it is easy to see that Conditions 2–4 are automatically satisfied. We suppose first
that ACB = A
D
B . This implies that G(A
C
B) = G(A
D
B ). From Lemma 4, U
C
0 > U
D
0 . This contradicts
the fact that UC0 = U
D
0 . Now suppose that A
C
B < A
D
B . Take ε > 0 such that A
C
B = A
Dε
B . Then
G(ACB) = G(A
Dε
B ) and Lemma 4 implies that U
C
0 < U
Dε
0 . Condition 3, in contrast, implies that
UDε0 < U
D
0 = U
C
0 and we have a contradiction. Therefore, A
C
B > A
D
B . Since U
C
0 = U
D
0 , the result
follows from (6).
Proof of Theorem 4
In the screening equilibrium, the low-growth firm takes the fixed-interest loan, while the
high-growth firm takes the risk-compensating PSD loan, which we construct below. The market
believes that the firm is the low-growth type for sure if it takes the fixed-interest loan, and the
firm is the high-growth type for sure if it takes the risk-compensating PSD loan. Both firms
may issue new equity to finance debt payments if needed. However, the firm is perceived as the
high-growth type by the market as long as it raises capital only from the existing stock holders,
who can observe its true type directly. If it tries to sell its equity to outside investors, the market
will infer that this is the low-growth firm. If the existing shareholders try to sell their shares to
outside investors, the market will also perceive it as the low-growth firm.
When the bankruptcy costs is zero, the equity value is equal to the asset value minus the debt
value. Hence, the IC constraint (16) for the low-growth firm becomes
AL −M ≥ ϕ
(
AL − UC
′
1
L (AL)
)
+ (1− ϕ) (AH −M) (43)
and
AH −M ≥ ϕ
(
AH − UC0H (AH)
)
+ (1− ϕ) (AL −M) (44)
32Here we use the fact that WDε0 (x) is continuous in ε, which is an easy consequence of Corollary 4.
31
for the high-growth firm.
Since for the same fixed-interest debt C0, the high-growth firm is less likely to default than
the low-growth firm,
UC0H (AH) ≥ UC0L (AL) =M.
Hence, constraint (44) always holds.
Constraint (43) can be rewritten as follows
ϕ ≥ AH −AL
AH −M −
(
AL − UC
′
1
L (AL)
) . (45)
We now construct a linear PSD such that (45) holds. Suppose that one can find β0 and β1 such
that UC1H = M , A
L
B = AL and U
C′1
L = AL, where A
L
B is the default triggering level of the low-
growth firm when issuing the PSD. With such PSD, punishment for low asset levels is so steep
that the low-growth firm prefers to default immediately if it issues it. When U
C′1
L = AL, equation
(45) becomes equivalent to equation (18). Thus, the proof will be complete provided that one
can indeed construct a linear PSD such that UC1H = M and A
L
B = A
L. We first set ALB = A
L
as wished. From (11), AHB = χA
L, where χ = (γH1 (1 + γ
L
1 )/(γ
L
1 (1 + γ
H
1 )). Since the function
m→ (1 + γ(m))/(γ(m)(r − σ2/2−m)), where γ(m) = (m+√m2 + 2rσ2)/σ2, is increasing in m
for all r and σ, we have that χ < (r − µL)/(r − µH), and hence that AHB < AH . From (10), and
using that WC1H = AH − UC1H as well as (11), the condition UC1H =M can be rewritten as
AH −M = λ
[
AH −AHB
(
AH
AHB
)−γH1
−AHB
1 + γH1
γH1
(
1−
(
AH
AHB
)−γH1 )]
. (46)
One may plug this value of AHB into (46) to obtain the value of λ. Since
Φ(x, y) =
(
1
1 + x
)y
+ xy > 1
for33 all x, y > 0, we have that
1
1 + x
(1 + x)−y +
1
1 + x
1 + y
y
(1− (1 + x)−y) < 1 (47)
for all x, y > 0, and thus λ is positive. Since χ ≥ 1, we have that AHB ≥ AL and thus
AHB
(
AH
AHB
)−γH1
+AHB
1 + γH1
γH1
(
1−
(
AH
AHB
)−γH1 )
≥ AL > M
and λ > 1. Since λ = (r−µH)+β1(r−µH) , β1 > 0. From (11) and using A
H
B = χA
L, β0 =
(1+γL1 )r
γL1
ALλ.
Therefore, β0 > 0 and this concludes the proof.
33Indeed, Φ(0, y) = 1 for all y > 0, and ∂Φ(x, y)/∂x is positive for all x, y > 0.
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Figure 3: Comparison of ratings-based PSD and standard debt.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Loan Deals
This table contains summary statistics for the sample of 5,020 loan deals from 1995 to 2005.
PSD Variable mean sd p10 p50 p90
No Loan Size .230 .478 .015 .0946 .518
Maturity 2.981 1.964 1 3 5
> 1 Tranche Indicator .290 .453 0 0 1
Rating(t) 10.911 3.612 7 11 16
Return Volatility .103 .0632 .0469 .0871 .175
Market-to-Book .961 1.060 .177 .650 2.031
Log(Size) 3.319 1.838 .993 3.499 5.416
# of Steps 0 0 0 0 0
Performance-Pricing Spread 0 0 0 0 0
Yes Loan Size .490 .996 .050 .220 1.131
Maturity 3.602 1.694 1 3 5.5
> 1 Tranche Indicator .403 .490 0 0 1
Rating(t) 12.004 3.083 8 12 16
Return Volatility .112 .0617 .050 .099 .189
Market-to-Book .918 .864 .232 .676 1.828
Log(Size) 2.675 1.745 .641 2.778 4.859
# of Steps 5.082 3.095 1 5 8
Performance-Pricing Spread 72.681 48.076 12.5 70 137.5
Total Loan Size .334 .742 .022 .138 .763
Maturity 3.249 1.878 1 3 5
> 1 Tranche Indicator .335 .472 0 0 1
Rating(t) 11.348 3.451 7 11 16
Return Volatility .106 .062 .047 .092 .181
Market-to-Book .944 .985 .198 .661 1.961
Log(Size) 3.065 1.829 .817 3.196 5.231
# of Steps 2.034 3.168 0 0 6
Performance-Pricing Spread 29.218 46.894 0 0 100
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Table 2: Effects of PSD on ∆Rating(t+ 4)
This table presents coefficient estimates for ordered probit models estimating how the presence of performance
pricing provisions affects the probability of being upgraded or downgraded four quarters after the loan closing date.
All standard errors are heteroskedacity robust, and clustered at the borrowing firm.
Different Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
PSD 0.119** 0.101** 0.097** 0.098** 0.105**
(0.048) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.048)
Loan Size 0.113** 0.079** 0.069** 0.080** 0.117**
(0.042) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042)
Average Maturity -0.034** -0.035** -0.026** -0.058** -0.040**
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
> 1 Tranche Indicator -0.041 0.002 0.027 0.057 -0.040
(0.053) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.052)
# of Covenants 0.078 0.084 0.070 0.046 0.074
(0.089) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.089)
Current Rating -0.197** -0.068** -0.066** -0.064** -0.194**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
Return Volatility 2.562** 2.802**
(0.545) (0.488)
Market-to-Book -0.238** -0.232**
(0.029) (0.028)
Log(Size) -0.159** -0.153**
(0.017) (0.017)
Industry Yes Yes No No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes No No
Pseudo-R2 0.115 0.061 0.041 0.030 0.110
N 3574 5020 5020 5020 3574
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3: Effects of PSD on Ratings for Different Time Horizons
This table presents coefficient estimates for ordered probit models estimating how the presence of performance
pricing provisions affects the probability of being upgraded or downgraded one, two, four and eight quarters after
the loan closing date. All standard errors are heteroskedacity robust, and clustered at the borrowing firm.
Dependent Variable
∆Rating
(t+ 4) (t+ 1) (t+ 2) (t+ 8)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
PSD 0.119** 0.084 0.119** 0.088**
(0.048) (0.065) (0.055) (0.044)
Loan Size 0.113** 0.113** 0.082** 0.083**
(0.042) (0.049) (0.040) (0.038)
Average Maturity -0.034** -0.037* -0.041** -0.031**
(0.015) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013)
> 1 Tranche Indicator -0.041 0.146** 0.096 -0.044
(0.053) (0.070) (0.060) (0.047)
# of Covenants 0.078 -0.002 0.015 0.228**
(0.089) (0.130) (0.110) (0.077)
Rating(t) -0.197** -0.179** -0.178** -0.189**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
Return Volatility 2.562** 2.113** 2.239** 1.956**
(0.545) (0.680) (0.645) (0.524)
Market-to-Book -0.238** -0.212** -0.203** -0.215**
(0.029) (0.041) (0.032) (0.026)
Log(Size) -0.159** -0.160** -0.152** -0.162**
(0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.115 0.131 0.118 0.109
N 3574 3574 3574 3574
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 4: Dependence on the Credit Quality of the Borrowing Firm
This table presents coefficient estimates for ordered probit models estimating how the presence of performance
pricing provisions affects the probability of being upgraded or downgraded four quarters after the loan closing date.
All model specifications contain an interaction term between the PSD dummy and the credit rating of the borrowing
firm at the loan closing date. All standard errors are heteroskedacity robust, and clustered at the borrowing firm.
Different Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
PSD 0.121** 0.101** 0.090** 0.095** 0.110**
(0.055) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.055)
PSD*Rating(t) 0.014 0.029 0.054 0.031 0.006
(0.087) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.087)
Loan Size 0.115** 0.082** 0.072** 0.082** 0.119**
(0.042) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043)
Average Maturity -0.035** -0.037** -0.028** -0.059** -0.041**
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
> 1 Tranche Indicator -0.036 0.006 0.030 0.059 -0.036
(0.053) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.052)
# of Covenants 0.080 0.082 0.069 0.052 0.079
(0.092) (0.073) (0.065) (0.068) (0.087)
Rating(t) -0.197** -0.067** -0.065** -0.063** -0.194**
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
Return Volatility 2.557** 2.794**
(0.544) (0.487)
Market-to-Book -0.238** -0.231**
(0.029) (0.028)
Log(Size) -0.159** -0.153**
(0.017) (0.017)
Industry Yes Yes No No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes No No
Pseudo-R2 0.115 0.061 0.041 0.030 0.110
N 3574 5020 5020 5020 3574
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 5: Effects of PSD on ROA for Different Time Horizons
This table presents coefficient estimates for probit models estimating how the presence of performance pricing
provisions affects ROA one, two, four and eight quarters after the loan closing date. All standard errors are
heteroskedacity robust, and clustered at the borrowing firm.
Dependent Variable
∆ROA
(t+ 4) (t+ 1) (t+ 2) (t+ 8)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
PSD 0.163** 0.069 0.183** 0.071
(0.079) (0.075) (0.077) (0.078)
Loan Size 0.225** -0.040 0.110* 0.194**
(0.102) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068)
Average Maturity -0.010 -0.013 -0.039 -0.025
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
> 1 Tranche Indicator -0.048 0.068 0.073 -0.046
(0.091) (0.083) (0.083) (0.086)
# of Covenants -0.002 0.061 -0.172 0.022
(0.143) (0.147) (0.147) (0.139)
Rating(t) -0.007 0.011 -0.001 -0.041**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Return Volatility -1.967** -1.375 -1.633* -0.889
(0.842) (0.836) (0.873) (0.849)
Market-to-Book 0.076* 0.152** 0.217** 0.094**
(0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.048)
Log(Size) -0.006 -0.144** -0.151** -0.032
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.058 0.044 0.061 0.081
N 3565 3569 3565 3566
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Construction of Variables
Variable Description
Rating(t) Credit rating of the borrower at the closing date (2 =
AAA, . . . , 27 = Default)
Investment Grade Dummy variable equal to 1 if Rating(t) is higher than or
equal to BBB− at the closing date
∆Rating(t+ k) Changes in credit rating of the borrower k quarters after the
loan closing date (0 = no changes; 1 = upgrade; −1 = down-
grade).
∆ROA(t+ k) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the return on assets ((Compus-
tat Data item #8)+(Compustat Data item #5)-(Compustat
Data item # 24))/(Compustat Data item # 44) of the bor-
rower k quarters after the loan closing date is higher than the
return on asset of the borrower at the quarter before the deal
closing date
Market-to-Book (Compustat Data item # 14)x(Compustat Data item #
61)/(Compustat Data item # 44)
Log(Size) Log(Compustat Data item # 6)
Industry Last two digits of dnum
Return Volatility Volatility of last 12-month returns
Loan Size Sum of loan amounts accross all tranches in a deal divided
by the variable Size
> 1 Tranche Indicator Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal has more than one
tranche
# of Covenants Number of covenants in a deal
# of Steps Number of steps in the performance pricing grid
Performance-Pricing Spread Difference in interest paid between the highest and lowest
credit quality in a performance pricing loan.
PSD Dummy for performance pricing provision (# of Steps > 0 or
Performance-Pricing Spread > 0)
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